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Abstract
We study the dynamic output and welfare effects of public infrastructure investment un-
der a balanced budget fiscal rule, using an overlapping generations model of a small open
economy. The government finances public investment by employing distortionary labor
taxes. We find a negative short-run output multiplier, which (in absolute terms) exceeds
the positive long-run output multiplier. In contrast to conventional results regarding
public investment shocks, we obtain dampened cycles in output and the labor tax rate.
The cyclical dynamics are induced by the interaction of households’ finite life spans, the
wealth effect on labor supply, and the balanced budget fiscal rule. Finally, we show that,
for a plausible calibration of our model, households’ lifetime welfare improves.
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1 Introduction
Many governments of industrialized nations have resorted to fiscal stimulus packages to help
weather the current global economic crisis. Public infrastructure investment—which is nar-
rowly defined to include highways, airports, bridges, railways, sewerage and water systems,
and dams other flood control structures (Bom and Ligthart, 2008)—were a key component
of the fiscal stimulus measures. Without any offsetting tax and expenditure measures, more
public investment boosts public spending, which in turn causes the short-run fiscal balance
to deteriorate. In view of rising fiscal deficits in various OECD countries, some governments
have been discussing whether to put legal bounds on their annual budget balance. The debate
in the United States, for example, has focused on balanced budget amendments for the federal
government.1 More recently, in Europe, the political leaders of France and Germany called for
all eurozone nations to enact constitutional amendments requiring balanced budgets.2 Can
public investment be effective in stimulating output and in improving welfare if the govern-
ment has to adhere to a balanced budget rule? What do the transitional dynamics induced
by a public investment impulse look like? The present paper addresses these questions.
Most contributions on the dynamic macroeconomic effects of public investment employ an
infinitely-lived representative agent framework for a closed economy without a leisure-labor
choice. Baxter and King (1993) and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), however, endogenize labor
supply, but do not discuss second-best welfare effects. Other contributions explicitly focus
on the growth effects of public capital by assuming constant returns to scale in reproducible
factors of production. Key contributions in this area are those by Barro (1990) and Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994, 1997). The theoretical literature has not yet paid much attention to the
output dynamics of public investment when households are finitely lived. Such a specification
does not only provide a realistic description of the household sector, but is also instrumental
in arriving at an endogenously determined (non-hysteretic) steady state in a small open
1See Poterba (1995) for a background to this discussion. Note that the majority of the states are required
to balance their current budgets at the end of the fiscal year, whereas some states balance their budgets on a
two-year cycle (cf. Poterba and Rueben, 2001). States can borrow, however, for capital account purposes.
2Eurozone countries have adopted the euro and have signed on to the Stability and Growth Pact, which
prescribes a ceiling on annual budget deficits of 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
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economy context.3 Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) and Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010)
employ models of finitely-lived households, but assume public investment to be financed by
lump-sum taxes.4 In practice, countries do not have access to lump-sum taxes and fund their
spending by distortionary taxes. In fact, labor income taxes account for about one third of
total tax revenues and almost 10 percent of GDP in OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Labor
income taxes affect households’ consumption-leisure tradeoff and therefore have important
labor market and welfare effects. Our paper investigates how labor market distortions interact
with the positive spillovers of public investment. In view of this labor market and welfare
focus, it is pivotal to provide a realistic description of households’ preferences.
So far, the public capital literature has employed a rather restrictive specification of house-
holds’ preferences and therefore has not come to grips with the labor dynamics of public
investment. Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) ignore the household’s labor-leisure choice by as-
suming exogenous labor supply. Heijdra, Van der Horst, and Meijdam (2002) endogenize
labor supply, but assume Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) preferences, which do
not feature a wealth effect on labor supply. Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010) in turn employ
a Cobb-Douglas utility function. In this paper, we employ a more general preference speci-
fication, that is, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, which allows
us to separate the intratemporal substitution effect on labor supply from the intertemporal
substitution effect on labor supply. This distinction is important in view of the emphasis
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature has put on the intertemporal labor supply effect
for shock propagation (cf. Prescott, 2006). More important, recent empirical evidence (cf.
Kimball and Shapiro, 2008) shows that the size of the intertemporal substitution effect in
labor supply is non-negligible.
We develop a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy that includes a
public capital spillover on the production side. On the household side, we build a labor-leisure
tradeoff into the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) framework of finitely-lived households. The
3Small open economy models of the Ramsey type yield a hysteretic steady state, reflecting the requirement
that the rate of interest should equal the pure rate of time preference for a meaningful steady state to exist.
4A notable exception is the unpublished paper by Heijdra, Van der Horst, and Meijdam (2002), who
employ a very restrictive preference specification based on Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988). See
the discussion below.
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government adheres to a balanced budget fiscal policy rule by employing distortionary labor
taxes to finance public investment. To avoid trivial capital dynamics, we postulate adjustment
costs of both private and public investment. In line with the literature on open economy
macroeconomics, there is an internationally traded bond, which guarantees that households
can use the current account of the balance of payments to smooth private consumption.
Although a large number of our key results can be derived analytically, we provide a numerical
simulation based on plausible parameters for a typical small open economy in the OECD area.
We find that a balanced budget increase in public investment induces dampened cycles
in output and other key macroeconomic variables, whereas existing public investment studies
obtain monotonic impulse responses. The dampened cycles arise from the interaction of
households’ finite planning horizons, the wealth effect on labor supply, and the government’s
balanced budget rule. The non-monotonic transition paths do not depend on the presence
of the public capital externality. However, in a framework of infinitely-lived households the
cycles disappear, owing to the absence of a wealth effect on labor supply during transition.
We show that private investment, employment, and output fall in the short run, reflecting
the reduction in labor supply caused by distortionary labor taxes. However, more public
investment increases long-run output. In the benchmark case, we find an output multiplier
of 2.25, which falls short of the value of 2.71 found in the lump-sum tax financing case (cf.
Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart, 2010). In the long run, employment increases as long as the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is larger than unity. On the one
hand, this positive employment effect reinforces the long-run output effect. On the other
hand, the higher intratemporal elasticity of labor supply increases labor market distortions
and exacerbates the short-run output contraction. Finally, our numerical analysis reveals
that a balanced budget public investment impulse improves households’ lifetime welfare in
the benchmark calibration. This result suggests that public investment should be encouraged
even if labor tax financing is distortionary.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the dynamic macroeconomic framework
for a small open economy. Section 3 analyzes the steady state and its stability and presents
a simple graphical framework. Section 4 studies the long-run macroeconomic and welfare
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effects of a balanced budget public investment impulse. Section 5 analyzes numerically the
transitional dynamics and long-run effects of a public investment shock. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
This section develops a micro-founded dynamic macroeconomic model for a typical industri-
alized small open economy. Subsequently, it discusses the behavior of individual households,
aggregate households, firms, and the government.
2.1 Individual Households
The economy is inhabited by finitely-lived households, who face a constant probability of
death equal to their rate of birth (denoted by β). Because the population size is constant, we
can normalize it to unity. There are infinitely many disconnected generations, reflecting the
absence of bequests. Expected lifetime utility at time t of a household born at time v ≤ t is
given by an additively time-separable utility function:
Λ(v, t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
lnU(v, τ)e−(α+β)(τ−t)dτ, α > 0, β ≥ 0, (1)
where α is the pure rate of time preference and U(v, t) represents a CES sub-utility index:
U(v, t) ≡
[
εCC(v, t)
σC−1
σC + (1− εC) [1− L(v, t)]
σC−1
σC
] σC
σC−1
, 0 < εC < 1, σC ≥ 0, (2)
where εC is the consumption weight in utility, C(v, t) denotes private consumption, L(v, t) is
hours of labor supplied,5 and σC is the elasticity of substitution between private consumption
and leisure. By choosing a CES specification of sub-utility, we model nonseparability between
consumption and labor and embed the Cobb-Douglas specification for σC = 1. Equation (2)
introduces a wealth effect on labor supply; that is, labor effort depends on the intertemporal
consumption-savings choice.
5The total time available to the household has been normalized to unity so that 1−L(v, t) denotes leisure.
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We define ‘full’ consumption as the market value of private consumption and leisure:
X(v, t) ≡ P (t)U(v, t) = C(v, t) + w¯(t) [1− L(v, t)] , (3)
where P (t) is the utility-based consumer price index (see [11) below], w¯(t) ≡ w(t)[1 − tL(t)]
is the after-tax real wage rate, w(t) represents the before-tax real wage rate, tL(t) is a pro-
portional labor income tax, and r denotes the exogenously given world rate of interest. We
use private consumption as numeraire commodity, whose price has been normalized to unity.
The household’s flow budget constraint is:
A˙(v, t) = (r + β)A(v, t) + w¯(t)−X(v, t), (4)
where A˙(v, t) ≡ dA(v, t)/dt, with A(v, t) denoting real financial wealth. In keeping with
Blanchard (1985), households contract actuarially fair ‘reverse’ life insurance. While alive,
households receive an effective rate of return r + β on their financial wealth. In the event of
death, the insurance company appropriates all the wealth of the household.
The representative household of cohort v, who is endowed with perfect foresight, maxi-
mizes lifetime utility (1)–(2) subject to its budget identity (4) and a no-Ponzi game solvency
condition. We solve the household’s problem by two-stage budgeting. In the first stage, the
household decides on its consumption over time, yielding the individual full consumption
Euler equation:
X˙(v, t)
X(v, t)
=
U˙(v, t)
U(v, t)
+
P˙ (t)
P (t)
= r − α. (5)
We study the case of a patient nation (i.e., r > α), which generates rising individual con-
sumption profiles. Equation (5) says that full consumption growth rises with the real rate
of interest and falls with the pure rate of time preference. By integrating (4), we obtain full
consumption as a constant proportion of the household’s wealth portfolio:
X(v, t) = (α+ β) [A(v, t) +H(v, t)] , (6)
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where H(v, t) denotes lifetime human wealth of vintage v at time t:
H(v, t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
w¯(τ)e−(r+β)(τ−t)dτ, (7)
which equals the present discounted value of the current and future after-tax returns to labor.
In the second stage, the household allocates C(v, t) and 1 − L(v, t) such that (2) is
maximized subject to (3). Combining the first-order conditions gives rise to: C(v,t)1−L(v,t) =(
εC
1−εC
)σC
w¯(t)σC . By substituting this optimality condition into (3), we obtain:
C(v, t) = [1− ωN (t)]X(v, t), (8)
w¯(t) [1− L(v, t)] = ωN (t)X(v, t), (9)
where ωN (t) is the (time-varying) share of leisure in full consumption:
ωN (t) ≡ (1− εC)σC
(
w¯(t)
P (t)
)1−σC
, 0 < ωN (t) < 1. (10)
Equations (8) and (9) relate private goods consumption and leisure consumption to the level
of full consumption. Households supply more hours of labor if gross wages rise, the labor
tax rate falls, the share of leisure in full consumption drops, or full consumption falls. By
substituting (8) and (9) into (2), we obtain the utility-based consumer price index:
P (t) ≡

[
εσCC + (1− εC)σC w¯(t)1−σC
] 1
1−σC for σC 6= 1
(
1
εC
)εC ( w¯(t)
1−εC
)1−εC
for σC = 1
. (11)
2.2 Aggregate Households
The size of cohort v at time t is a fraction βeβ(v−t) of the total population.6 Therefore,
the relationship between aggregate full consumption and individual full consumption of each
6We assume large cohorts, so that frequencies and probabilities coincide by the law of large numbers.
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individual household is:
X(t) =
∫ t
−∞
X(v, t)βeβ(v−t)dv. (12)
By aggregating (5) over all existing generations, we arrive at the modified Keynes-Ramsey
(MKR) rule:
X˙(t)
X(t)
= r − α− β(α+ β)A(t)
X(t)
=
X˙(v, t)
X(v, t)
− β · X(t)−X(t, t)
X(t)
. (13)
The expression after the second equality sign says that aggregate full consumption growth
equals individual full consumption growth (the first term) minus the ‘generational turnover
effect’ (the second term), that is, the wealth redistribution caused by the passing away of
generations. Intuitively, old generations have accumulated wealth over the course of their life,
whereas new generations are born without financial wealth (i.e., A(t, t) = 0). Consequently,
the full consumption level of new generations X(t, t) falls short of the average full consumption
level X(t).
2.3 Firms
The representative firm hires L(t) hours of labor and rents K(t) units of capital services to
produce homogeneous output Y (t) according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y (t) = K(t)εY L(t)1−εYKG(t)η, 0 < εY < 1, η ≥ 0, (14)
where εY is the output elasticity of private capital, η is the output elasticity of public capital,
and KG(t) denotes the public capital stock. The public capital stock is assumed to give rise
to a positive production externality, which is measured by η.7 Heijdra and Meijdam (2002)
and most other authors also employ a Cobb-Douglas technology, which implies that public
capital augments the private factors of production in a Hicks-neutral fashion.8 The restriction
7The government cannot charge a user fee on the firm’s use of public capital.
8Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010) employ a more general CES technology to analyze the factor-augmenting
role of public capital.
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0 < η + εY < 1 ensures diminishing returns with respect to private and public capital taken
together, thus excluding endogenous growth.
To allow non-trivial capital dynamics, we model adjustment costs in private investment.
Net capital formation is linked to gross investment I(t) according to the following function:
K˙(t) =
[
Φ
(
I(t)
K(t)
)
− δ
]
K(t), Φ(0) = 0, Φ′(·) > 0, Φ′′(·) < 0, (15)
where δ is the rate of depreciation of private capital and Φ (·) is the installation cost function
of private capital. The degree of physical capital mobility of private capital is given by
0 < ρA ≡ − IK Φ
′′(·)
Φ′(·)  ∞, where a small ρA characterizes a high degree of physical capital
mobility.
The firm maximizes the net present value of its cash flow,
V (t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[Y (τ)− w(τ)L(τ)− I(τ)] e−r(τ−t)dτ, (16)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint (15) and the stock of public capital. Note that
we have normalized the prices of final output and investment goods to unity. Solving the
firm’s optimization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
w(t) = (1− εY )Y (t)
L(t)
, (17)
1 = q(t)Φ′
(
I(t)
K(t)
)
, (18)
q˙(t)
q(t)
+ εY
Y (t)
K(t)
= r + δ −
[
Φ
(
I(t)
K(t)
)
− I(t)
K(t)
Φ′
(
I(t)
K(t)
)]
, (19)
where q(t) denotes Tobin’s q, which is defined as the market value of the private capital stock
relative to its replacement costs. Equation (17) describes a downward sloping labor demand
relationship in the (w,L) space. Equation (18) represents the investment-capital ratio as a
function of Tobin’s q. Finally, equation (19) captures the evolution over time of Tobin’s q,
which shows that the return on investment in private capital (left-hand side)—consisting of
the shadow capital gain/loss and the marginal product of private capital—should equal the
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user cost of private capital (right-hand side).9
2.4 Government
The government invests IG(t) in infrastructure capital and consumes CG(t) goods. We study
the case in which the government commits to a balanced budget at each instant of time by
levying a proportional labor income tax:
IG(t) + CG(t) = tL(t)w(t)L(t). (20)
Just like firms, the government faces convex adjustment costs in gross investment. Public
capital accumulates according to:
K˙G(t) =
[
ΦG
(
IG(t)
KG(t)
)
− δG
]
KG(t), ΦG(0) = 0, Φ
′
G(·) > 0, Φ′′G(·) < 0, (21)
where δG is the rate of depreciation of public capital and ΦG (·) is the installation cost function
of public capital. The parameter 0 < χG ≡ IGΦ
′
G(·)
KG
∞ represents the elasticity of the public
capital installation cost function.
2.5 Foreign Sector and Market Equilibrium
Foreign financial capital F (t) is perfectly mobile across borders. The change in net foreign
assets is determined by the balance on the current account of the balance of payments:
F˙ (t) = rF (t) + Z(t), (22)
where rF (t) denotes the return on net foreign assets and Z(t) are net exports.
The goods market, which does not feature any rigidities, clears at each instant of time,
yielding Y (t) = C(t) + CG(t) + I(t) + IG(t) + Z(t). Similarly, the labor market equilibrates
9Without adjustment costs, we have Φ (·) = I(t)/K(t) and Φ′(·) = 1. Equation (18) then reduces to q = 1.
In this case, K(t) adjusts instantaneously to its steady-state level. Consequently, equation (19) reduces to
εY
Y (t)
K(t)
= r + δ, which is the familiar expression for the rental rate derived in a static framework.
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instantly via a fully flexible real gross wage. Asset market equilibrium is defined as:
A(t) = V (t) + F (t), (23)
where V (t) = q(t)K(t) denotes the firm’s stock market value. Assets in the household’s
portfolio are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Initially, A(0) = V (0) > 0 because F (0) = 0
and K(0) > 0. Physical capital is thus fully domestically owned.
3 Solving the Model
We now turn to solving the model outlined in the previous section. Section 3.1 derives the
reduced-form model, Section 3.2 analyzes numerically the model’s steady state and stability,
and Section 3.3 develops a simple graphical framework.
3.1 Deriving the Reduced-Form Model
We log-linearize the model around an initial steady state with F (0) = 0 (implying that the
current account is initially balanced). The log-linearized equations are reported in Table A.1.
A tilde (˜) denotes a relative change, that is, X˜(t) ≡ dX(t)/X, where X is the steady-state
value of X(t). Variables with a tilde and a dot represent the time rate of change relative to
the initial steady state, that is, ˙˜X(t) ≡ dX˙(t)/X = X˙(t)/X. For financial assets and human
capital, we use a slightly different notation: A˜(t) ≡ rdA(t)/Y and ˙˜A(t) ≡ rdA˙(t)/Y . Finally,
for the labor tax rate we employ: t˜L(t) ≡ dtL(t)/(1− tL).
The dynamic equations of the model can be reduced to a model in two predetermined
variables (i.e., the private capital stock and financial assets) and two non-predetermined
variables (i.e., Tobin’s q and full consumption). By collecting relative changes of variables in
the vector z˜(t) ≡ [K˜(t) q˜(t) X˜(t) A˜(t)]′ and shock terms in the vector Γ(t) ≡ [0 γq(t) 0 γA(t)]′,
we write the reduced-form dynamic system as:
˙˜z(t) = ∆z˜(t)− Γ(t), (24)
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where ∆ is a 4× 4 Jacobian matrix (see Appendix A.1).
Let us first focus on a number of special cases giving rise to characteristic roots that
are real. The trivial case of exogenous labor supply yields a dynamic system that can be
decomposed in two independent subsystems, that is, an investment subsystem [q˜(t), K˜(t)] and
a savings subsystem [X˜(t), A˜(t)]. The model is saddle-path stable; we obtain two positive and
two negative real roots.10 If households have infinite life spans (i.e., β = 0), the generational
turnover effect drops from (13). For a steady state to exist, the knife-edge condition r = α
should hold, implying that the third row of ∆ consists of zeros only. In that case, there is a
zero root in full consumption, one negative real root, and two positive real roots. The model
features a hysteretic steady state.
For the general case of endogenous labor supply, the dynamic system is non-recursive.
The dynamic properties of the system depend crucially on ωLL, σC , β, and tL. The solution
of the characteristic polynomial corresponding to (24) may potentially yield complex-valued
roots. To get insight into the properties of the roots, we pursue a numerical analysis.
3.2 Solving the Model Numerically
This section investigates the model numerically based on plausible parameter values taken
from the literature and data.
3.2.1 Parameter Values
We choose parameter values in such a way as to match the characteristics of a typical small
open economy in the OECD area (Table 1). The time unit represents a year. We assume a
probability of death β of 1.82 percent to reflect an average expected life span of 55 working
years. The world rate of interest is fixed at 4 percent. We assume that both private and
public capital depreciate at the rate of 10 percent. Following Baxter and King (1993), the
ratio of public consumption to GDP (ωCG) is set to 20 percent. In addition, the ratio of public
investment to GDP (ωIG) takes on a value of 5 percent, which is somewhat above the average
for industrialized countries, but more closely in line with data for southern European member
10Bom and Ligthart (2011) provide the derivations.
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states. Our quantitative results depend crucially on the size of the output elasticity of public
capital η. Based on Bom and Ligthart’s (2008) meta-analysis of estimated values of η, we
employ η = 0.08. We perform a sensitivity analysis on this parameter later on.
Because our model features labor market distortions of public investment, its quantita-
tive implications depend to a great extent on the size of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ω¯LL ≡ ωLL[1+(σC−1)(1−ωN )] (which also captures the intratemporal substitution elasticity
of labor supply) and on the leisure-labor ratio ωLL ≡ (1−L)/L (which governs the intertem-
poral elasticity of labor supply).11 Kimball and Shapiro (2008) claim that ‘[modest long-run
elasticities of labor supply are] one of the best-documented regularities in economics’ (p. 1).
In our model, a zero long-run (uncompensated) elasticity of labor supply implies ω¯LL = ωLL,
which in turn requires a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
(i.e., σC = 1).
12 Kimball and Shapiro (2008) report estimates of the Frisch elasticity of about
one and refer to a number of papers finding smaller estimates. RBC models, on the other
hand, typically require larger elasticities; Prescott (2006), for instance, assumes Frisch elas-
ticities of at least two.13 However, Prescott (2006) claims that this feature of RBC models
is not necessarily incompatible with the evidence at the micro level, as adjustments at the
extensive margin generate larger elasticities at the aggregate level than at the individual level.
In the baseline case, we assume ω¯LL = ωLL = 2 and σC = 1. Later on, we investigate the
sensitivity of our results to different values of ωLL and σC .
The respective installation cost functions for private and public investment are:
Φ
(
I
K
)
≡ z¯ ln
I
K + z¯
z¯
, ΦG
(
IG
KG
)
≡ z¯G ln
IG
KG
+ z¯G
z¯G
, (25)
where z¯ and z¯G are constants. From (25) and the definitions of ρA and χG, we derive
ρA = (I/K)/(I/K + z¯) and χG = (IG/KG)z¯G/(IG/KG + z¯G). Setting z¯ = 0.532 and using
δ = 0.10 yields I/K = 0.11 in the steady state. The latter together with z¯ implies steady-
11The Frisch labor supply elasticity holds the marginal utility of wealth constant.
12Much of the microeconomic evidence points to a σC smaller than one (Pencavel, 1986), which is at odds
with the implied elasticity of aggregate labor supply. However, RBC models are often calibrated with values
of σC close to one. We follow the latter approach.
13Uhlig (2010) works with a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of unity.
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state adjustment costs of about 0.2 percent of GDP. Similarly, choosing z¯G = 0.532 and using
δG = 0.10 gives rise to IG/KG = 0.11. In this way, we arrive at adjustment costs of similar
size for public capital. These parameters imply ρA = 0.171 and χG = 0.091.
Given the fixed rate of interest, our calibration yields rising individual consumption pro-
files, where α is used as a calibration parameter to arrive at A = qK.14 Once the parameters
are set, all other information on the relevant macroeconomic ratios, initial tax rate, and tech-
nology and preference parameters can be derived. By setting the output share of private
consumption to 0.55, we find a ratio of investment to output of 0.20. The implied output
elasticity of private capital is 0.29, implying that the condition η < 1−εY = 0.71 is easily met.
The implied ratio of output to private capital is 0.55, which is slightly lower than the value
found by Cooley and Prescott (1995). For the public capital stock, we derive Y/KG = 2.20,
which is roughly in line with Kamps (2006), who finds a value of around 2. In keeping with
the average for OECD countries, the balanced budget labor income tax rate is 0.35. The
implied preference parameters are: ωN = 0.63 and εC = 0.37.
3.2.2 Roots and Stability
Panel (a) of Figure 1 analyzes model stability for various values of ωLL and σC . The negatively
sloped solid curve represents the upper bound on the parameter region that yields a stable
solution. Provided ωLL is not too large for a given σC , the model has a unique and locally
saddle-point stable steady state. We find two negative roots and two positive roots that
are potentially complex valued. In the stable complex case (in which case the roots feature
two negative and two positive real parts), the analytical solution for the transition paths
of the variables includes cosine and sine terms, which give rise to endogenously determined
dampened oscillations in key variables (Bom and Ligthart, 2011). The dotted line demarcates
the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region; it approaches the σC-axis only if σC →∞,
whereas it intersects the vertical axis at the benchmark value of ωLL. Point C (σC = 1, ωLL =
2) indicates the benchmark calibration, which lies within the stable, cyclical region. The solid
line distinguishes the stable region with dampened cycles from the unstable region. To obtain
14For the special case of the infinite-horizon model, we set r = α.
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cyclical dynamics, a smaller value of σC needs to be compensated by a higher ωLL.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that, for the case of infinitely-lived households (i.e., β = 0)
and small values of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, we never end up in the cyclical
region, reflecting the real nature of the roots. For β = 0 and ωLL = 2, the infinite-horizon
model is unstable. However, in the calibration point C (β = 0.018, ωLL = 2) we find stable,
cyclical dynamics. The dotted line shows that for smaller values of β, a higher value of ωLL
is needed to take the economy into the stable region with dampened cycles. Conversely, the
solid line indicates that for smaller values of β, a smaller value of ωLL is needed to stay within
the stable, cyclical zone.
Figure 2 studies stability for various combinations of tL and σC . The dotted line represents
the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region, whereas the lower solid line demarcates
the lower bound of the unstable region. The dark grey region in between the dashed lines
shows combinations of points on the negatively sloping segment of the Laffer curve [see (30)
and (33) below]. Areas with light grey coloring are unstable. The white upper north-east
corner in the figure—which is bounded by the solid and dashed lines—represents a stable,
non-cyclical region. However, this zone does not yield economically meaningful parameter
combinations. The dotted line shows that for smaller values of σC , a higher value of tL is
required to yield a stable, cyclical outcome. The calibration point C (σC = 1, tL = 0.35)
is located in the stable, cyclical region, where the economy operates on the upward sloping
segment of the Laffer curve.
In sum, endogenous labor supply, finite planning horizons, and a sufficiently high initial
labor tax rate are necessary to give rise to dampened cyclical dynamics. See Section 5 for
an economic explanation. Because we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function, the
characteristic roots do not depend on the size of the production externality. Intuitively, in
the Cobb-Douglas case, a rise in the size of the spillover effect does not induce a direct
substitution between private capital and labor.15 Once we introduce public debt to keep
the labor tax rate constant—and thus relax the balanced budget rule—the cyclical dynamics
disappear. However, this tax smoothing scenario takes us beyond the scope of the current
15If one considers a more general production function, such as a CES, public capital yields a direct substi-
tution effect. See Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010) for an exposition of this case under lump-sum taxation.
14
paper.16
3.3 Graphical Framework
We develop a simple graphical apparatus that will help us in analyzing the transitional dynam-
ics of a public investment impulse. More specifically, the framework describes the dynamic
interaction between full consumption, financial assets, and the labor market.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 depicts equilibrium in the labor market (E0) conditional on the
private capital stock, the public capital stock, the labor tax rate, and full consumption.
Equation (17) describes the labor demand curve (labeled Ld0), which is a positive function
of both private and public capital. The aggregate version of (9) yields the compensated or
Frisch labor supply curve (labeled Ls0), which depends negatively on full consumption and
the labor tax rate. The slope of the labor supply curve assumes a positive (intratemporal)
substitution effect on labor supply (see Section 4 for a further discussion).
Panel (b) of Figure 3 displays the savings system—consisting of the variables X(t) and
A(t)—conditional on the private capital stock. The MKR locus presents the modified Keynes-
Ramsey (MKR) rule, which corresponds to (13) in steady state. The household budget
identity (HBI) locus is given by the steady-state aggregate version of (4). The intersection of
the MKR and HBI loci determines the (X0, A0) equilibrium.
4 Analytical Long-Run Effects of Public Investment
This section studies the long-run allocation and welfare effects of an unanticipated and per-
manent increase in public investment (i.e., dIG > 0). We assume a second-best world in which
the government has to resort to a distortionary labor income tax to balance its budget at each
instant of time. The policy shock occurs at time t = 0 and the economy reaches a new steady
state at t → ∞. The policy change is unanticipated in the sense that it is simultaneously
announced and implemented.
16The tax smoothing scenario requires public debt to be introduced into the analysis. The results and Matlab
program are available upon request.
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4.1 Capital and Labor Markets
The increase in public investment boosts—via the accumulation function of public capital—
the long-run stock of public capital:
dKG(∞)
dIG
=
1
Φ−1G (δG)
> 0. (26)
We note that (15), (21), and (18) imply that the I/K ratio, the IG/KG ratio, and Tobin’s q
are fixed in the long run. By using (19) it also follows that the marginal product of private
capital is fixed. Hence, we find:
dK(∞)
dIG
=
η
(1− εY )y¯ωIG
+
K
L
dL(∞)
dIG
, (27)
where y¯ ≡ Y/K and we have made use of (26). Equation (27) shows a positive relationship
between the long-run private capital multiplier and the long-run employment multiplier. The
size of the intercept is positively affected by the size of the public capital externality and
negatively by the public investment-to-GDP ratio.
By totally differentiating (19), while using (26) and (27), we find the long-run gross wage
multiplier:
dw(∞)
dIG
=
YG
L
1
Φ−1G (δG)
=
η
LωIG
≥ 0. (28)
The long-run wage multiplier is always positive as long as there is a public capital externality.
Clearly, if η = 0, the gross wage rate is fixed by the world rate of interest.
As derived in Appendix A.2, the employment multiplier is given by:
dL(∞)
dIG
=
σ¯L
ωIGw
[
η − ωIG
1− tL(1 + σ¯L)
]
, (29)
where σ¯L = ω¯LL−ωLL denotes the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply. Using the
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definition of ω¯LL, we find:
σ¯L ≡ ωLL(σC − 1)(1− ωN )

< 0 if 0 < σC < 1
= 0 if σC = 1
> 0 if σC > 1
,
for ωLL > 0. The employment multiplier is zero if σ¯L = 0, which is the case if the elasticity
of substitution between private consumption and labor supply is unity (in which case the
substitution effect of an after-tax wage change is exactly offset by the income effect) or the
intertemporal labor supply effect is zero (i.e., ωLL = 0) or both. Panel (a) of Figure 1
shows that a rise in public investment shifts the labor demand curve to the right and moves
the labor supply curve to the left, leaving the long-run level of employment unchanged (i.e.,
L0 = L∞). The sign of the bracketed term in (29) depends on the chosen parametrization.
The numerator of the expression is positive if public capital is sufficiently productive (i.e.,
η > ωIG), where η = ω
I
G corresponds to the ‘golden rule’ of public investment in a first-best
world (Fisher and Turnovsky, 1995, p. 771). The denominator is positive if σC is smaller
than the following upper bound:
σUC ≡ 1 +
1
ωLL(1− ωN )θL =
1− tL[1− ωLL(1− ωN )]
tLωLL(1− ωN ) > 1. (30)
Assuming that η > ωIG, we can consider three cases: (i) if 0 < σC < 1, which represents
the perverse case of a backward bending uncompensated labor supply curve, it follows that
dL(∞)/dIG < 0; (ii) if 1 < σC < σUC , we find dL(∞)/dIG > 0; and (iii) if σC > σUC , we
arrive at dL(∞)/dIG < 0. For unproductive public capital (η = 0) in special case (ii), the
employment multiplier is negative. Intuitively, private factors of production do not benefit
from public capital spillovers, but are negatively affected by the distortionary labor tax. To
foot the bill of the rise in public spending, the labor tax rate has to rise, which induces
households to work less.
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4.2 Labor Taxes and Output
Differentiating T (t) ≡ tL(t)w(t)L(t) with respect to IG gives the slope of the long-run Laffer
curve:
dT (∞)
dIG
= wL
[
dtL(∞)
dIG
+ tL
(
dw(∞)
dIG
1
w
+
dL(∞)
dIG
1
L
)]
. (31)
The first term between straight brackets represents the tax rate effect, whereas the second
and third terms capture tax base effects (which only materialize for tL > 0). If the term
between brackets is positive, the long-run Laffer curve is upward sloping in the (T, tL)-space.
The labor tax rate is adjusted to keep the government budget balanced, implying that the
left-hand side of (31) is set to zero. Using (29) and (28) into (31), imposing dT (∞)/dIG = 0,
and rewriting gives the long-run effect of public investment on the labor tax rate:
dtL(∞)
dIG
=
1− tL
wLωIG
[
ωIG − ηtL(1 + σ¯L)
1− tL(1 + σ¯L)
]
. (32)
If initial labor tax rates are zero, the term in square brackets in (32) is unambiguously positive,
so that a rise in public investment increases the labor tax rate. Hence, the economy operates
on the upward-sloping segment of the Laffer curve. If tL > 0, the sign of the numerator is
ambiguous. By setting this expression to zero, we can derive a lower bound on the elasticity
of substitution between private consumption and leisure:
σLC ≡
ωIG − ηtL[1− ωLL(1− ωN )]
ηtLωLL(1− ωN )

< 1 if ωIG < ηtL
= 1 if ωIG = ηtL
> 1 if ωIG > ηtL
. (33)
If tL > 0 and η > ω
I
G, then σ
L
C < σ
U
C . In this case, the long-run labor tax multiplier (32) is
positive if σC < σ
L
C or σC > σ
U
C and negative if σ
L
C < σC < σ
U
C . Note that the region σC > σ
U
C
is not very meaningful from an economic point of view. The threshold cases σC = σ
L
C and
σC = σ
U
C give rise to horizontal and vertical long-run Laffer curves, respectively.
Having derived the long-run changes in all inputs, we can now derive the long-run output
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multiplier. By totally differentiating (14), using (26)–(27), and (29), we get:
dY (∞)
dIG
=
1
(1− εY )ωIG
[
η +
σ¯L(η − ωIG)
1− tL(1 + σ¯L)
]
, (34)
where the first term in brackets corresponds to the private capital effect and the second term
describes the employment effect. If public capital is unproductive (i.e., η = 0), only the
negative part of the employment effect remains, so that the output multiplier is also negative
(provided σ¯L > 0). If household preferences are Cobb-Douglas (i.e., σ¯L = 0), the employment
effect drops completely, implying that the long-run output effect is not affected by the size of
the intertemporal labor supply elasticity.
4.3 Full Consumption, Net Foreign Assets, and Welfare
Plugging (28) and (29) into the differentiated household budget constraint gives the effect of
public investment on full consumption:
dX(∞)
dIG
=
ωX
ωA
rdA(∞)
dIG
=
ωX
(1− εY )ωIG
[
η − ωIG
1− tL(1 + σ¯L)
]
, (35)
where ωA ≡ rA/Y denotes the output share of asset income and ωX ≡ X/Y denotes the
output share of full consumption. If η > ωIG, the full consumption multiplier is positive
provided that σC < σ
U
C and negative if σC > σ
U
C .
Finally, to derive the effect on long-run foreign assets, we totally differentiate (23), while
using (27) and (35) and noting that Tobin’s q is at its initial value in the long run:
dF (∞)
dIG
= − ωA
r(1− εY )ωIG
[
η − (1− σ¯L)(η − ω
I
G)
1− tL(1 + σ¯L)
]
, (36)
where we have used that A = qK in the initial steady state.
The long-run instantaneous welfare effect of public investment follows from totally differ-
entiating X(t) = P (t)U(t) with respect to IG and using multipliers (28) and (35):
dU(∞)
dIG
=
(1− tL)[Lβ(α+ β) + (1− L)r(r − α)](η − ωIG)
PLωIG[1− tL(1 + σ¯L)][β(α+ β)− r(r − α)]
, (37)
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which implies that public investment is welfare improving in the long run if and only if η > ωIG,
provided that σC < σ
U
C . Clearly, unproductive public investment (i.e., η = 0) decreases long-
run welfare.
5 Quantitative Dynamic Effects of Public Investment
To quantify and visualize the dynamic macroeconomic effects of an unanticipated, permanent,
and balanced budget increase in public investment, we perform a simulation analysis based
on the parameter setting of Section 3.2.1. Section 5.1 illustrates the transitional dynamics
and Section 5.2 presents numerical results on both the short-run and long-run effects.
5.1 Impulse Responses
In generating the impulse responses of a public investment shock, we use the analytical
transition paths derived in Bom and Ligthart (2011), together with the steady-state log-
linearized equations of Table A1. To accommodate differences in the adjustment speed of
variables, we plot impulse response functions for 200 time periods. The public investment
impulse amounts to I˜G = 0.1 and occurs at time t = 0. Because the labor tax base changes
over time, the labor tax rate is endogenously varied to keep the government budget balanced
at each instant of time.
5.1.1 Allocation Effects in the Benchmark Case
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses for various values of the intertemporal labor supply
elasticity; that is, ωLL takes on values of 2.00 (solid line), 1.00 (dashed line), and 0 (dotted
line). Let us first focus on the benchmark scenario of ωLL = 2. On impact, employment falls,
the gross wage rate rises, and the labor tax rate increases. In terms of Panel (a) of Figure 3,
the labor supply curve Ls0 shifts to the left to L
s
1, whereas the labor demand curve L
d
0 remains
unaffected, thereby pushing up the gross wage rate. Intuitively, the rise in the labor tax rate
that is required to balance the government budget induces households to substitute toward
more leisure consumption. However, the fall in wealth—which prompts households to work
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harder and consume less private goods—alleviates the drop in employment. In Panel (b) of
Figure 3, the economy moves along the dotted dynamic path to point E1. Given that private
capital is a predetermined variable, the private capital-labor ratio rises. On impact, Tobin’s
q jumps down—reflecting a fall in the (future) marginal product of private capital—thereby
depressing private investment. Although both short-run domestic absorption and output fall,
the latter dominates so that short-run net imports rise. It is important to note that the short-
run drop in private consumption and private investment follows from the distortionary nature
of labor taxes; indeed, the opposite result obtains if lump-sum tax financing is considered (cf.
Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart, 2010).
Shortly after the shock, the private capital stock starts falling, reflecting depressed private
investment. Because labor and private capital are cooperative factors of production, the labor
demand curve shifts to the left from Ld1 to L
d
2 in Panel (a) of Figure 3. The private capital-
labor ratio rises further, taking the economy from E1 to E2 via the dotted dynamic path.
The rise in gross wages associated with the larger K/L-ratio increases full consumption;
see the move from E1 to E2 along the dynamic path in Panel (b) of Figure 3. Tobin’s q
eventually recovers, thereby increasing private investment and thus boosting private capital
accumulation. Together with the continuous expansion of the stock of public capital, this
accumulation of private capital causes employment to rise, which is represented by a shift of
the labor demand curve from Ld2 to L
d
3. Consequently, output increases substantially. The
labor tax base expands, allowing a reduction in the labor tax rate during periods 20 to 60.
Because the after-tax return on working increases, households supply more labor; that is, the
labor supply curve shifts to the right from Ls2 to L
s
3. The employment increment reaches
its maximum in point E3, which roughly coincides with the peaks of private capital stock
and output at about period 35. Panel (b) of Figure 3 reveals that financial assets and full
consumption also increase as the economy moves from point E2 to E3.
The economy enters into a new cycle in which the absolute increment in the capital stock
and employment is smaller than in the previous cycle. Intuitively, the labor tax rate needs
to rise to offset the fall in the labor tax base. However, to balance the public budget, the tax
base falls by less than in the previous cycle. In Panel (a) of Figure 3, the labor supply curve
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moves to the left to eventually—after going through a number of smaller oscillations—settle
in the new steady state. Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that full consumption and financial assets
also spiral toward E∞. In the new steady state, employment is not affected by the public
investment impulse, whereas output, the public capital stock, the private capital stock, private
consumption, and the labor tax rate are larger than in the initial steady state.17 In addition,
the country has accumulated foreign debt in the new equilibrium. Both gross and after-tax
wages have risen, whereas Tobin’s q returns to its initial steady-state value.
The benchmark case of endogenous intertemporal labor supply shows dampened cyclical
dynamics. Assuming the economy is within the stable region, a larger intertemporal labor
supply elasticity increases the amplitude of the cycles. Ignoring the intertemporal margin of
labor supply (i.e., ωLL = 0) yields monotonic transition paths for all the variables. Because
all three cases presented in Figure 4 assume σC = 1, long-run employment is not affected by
the public investment impulse. Nevertheless, long-run output rises, reflecting the increased
stocks of private and public capital.
5.1.2 Other Specifications
Panels (a)–(c) of Figure 5 show the responses of output and private consumption to a per-
manent public investment impulse for the special cases of infinitely-lived households (i.e.,
β = 0), unproductive public spending (i.e., η = 0), and elastic substitution between private
consumption and leisure (i.e., σC > 1). In each case, we allow the intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply to assume the values ωLL = 0 (dotted line), ωLL = 1 (dashed line), and
ωLL = 1.75 (solid line).
18 Panel (a) shows that the cycles disappear in the infinite-horizon
model.19 Because intergenerational spillovers are absent, all future costs and benefits of public
investment accrue to the infinitely-lived representative agent, who adjusts full consumption
once and for all at the time of the shock. The wealth effect triggers a negative response of
17The positive relationship between changes in private consumption and output is in line with evidence from
vector autoregressive (VAR) models (cf. Perotti, 2004).
18Note that the benchmark value of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (i.e., ωLL = 2) gives rise to
unstable dynamics in the infinite-horizon model (i.e., β = 0); see Panel (b) of Figure 1.
19In contrast to the findings of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the hysteretic and non-hysteretic model give
rise to very different transitional dynamics. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) employ a stochastic framework
and speak of non-stationary and stationary models. Whether the model is stochastic or deterministic does not
affect their key point.
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labor supply—which in turn causes a temporary drop in employment and output—but only
at impact. During transition, the wealth effect is switched off, thereby eliminating the cyclical
responses of employment and output. Notice that the absence of cycles is independent of ωLL.
Panel (b) depicts the case of unproductive public spending (i.e., η = 0). If labor supply is
inelastic, output is insensitive to unproductive public spending. Private consumption, how-
ever, falls over time, reflecting the higher labor tax rate required to balance the government
budget. If labor supply is elastic, unproductive public spending generates a small temporary
fall in output, which returns to its initial steady state in the long run. In this case, private
consumption drops at impact, but decreases only slightly over time to the new (lower) steady
state. The dampened cycles remain as long as labor supply is sufficiently elastic, pointing to
the role of distortionary labor taxes in generating non-monotonic dynamics.20
Finally, Panel (c) considers a larger elasticity of substitution between leisure and private
consumption (i.e., σC = 1.25 > 1). Values of σC larger than unity—which correspond to a
positive uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply—increase the amplitude of the output
effect. Intuitively, the labor supply elasticity σ¯L increases, yielding a more elastic labor supply
response to a change in the tax rate. As a result, the labor tax base becomes more elastic
too, which generates a larger tax base effect. To balance the government budget, the labor
tax rate has to change by more than under a small uncompensated wage elasticity of labor
supply. The assumption of ωLL = 1.75 gives rise to output dynamics qualitatively similar
to the benchmark case, reflecting the fact that a larger σC substitutes for a lower ωLL. In
contrast to the benchmark case, however, the larger value of σC generates a positive short-run
effect of public investment on private consumption.
5.1.3 Welfare Effects
Panel (a) of Figure 6 depicts the dynamic (instantaneous) welfare effects of a change in public
investment for ωLL = 2 (solid line), ωLL = 1 (dashed line), and ωLL = 0 (dotted line). If the
intertemporal labor supply elasticity is zero (i.e., ωLL = 0), the welfare profile is monotonically
20Heijdra and Ligthart (2010) show that external economies of scale cause Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2003)
key result to break down. The cycles in their framework disappear once the effect of external economies of
scale is switched off.
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rising starting from zero at impact to a positive long-run value. For ωLL > 0, however, the
dynamic welfare effects are non-monotonic, being positive in the short run and long run but
negative in the medium run. This negative medium-run welfare loss increases with ωLL, being
especially pronounced for the case giving rise to dampened cyclical dynamics (i.e., ωLL = 2).
The question arises as to how the discounted sum of welfare gains/losses is affected by
parameter changes. Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows, for various values of ωLL, the second-best
optimal public investment-to-GDP ratio, that is, the value of ωIG that maximizes the present
discounted value of instantaneous welfare given the government’s budget constraint. For
ωLL = 0—in which case labor taxes do not distort the labor market—the optimal level of
public investment is around 7.5 percent of GDP. For ωLL > 0, the optimal share of public
investment decreases to about 6 percent, slightly increasing with ωLL up to about ωLL = 2.2,
above which the dynamic system is no longer stable. The benchmark calibration point C lies
within the area of welfare gains, suggesting that, from a welfare perspective, public investment
should be increased to around 6 percent of GDP.
The welfare effects of public investment critically depend on the size of the public capital
externality. Panel (c) displays the welfare effects for η = 0.10 (dotted-dashed line), η = 0.08
(solid line), η = 0.05 (dashed line), and η = 0 (dotted line). Again, the welfare profiles display
dampened cycles. If public capital is unproductive, the welfare effects are always negative.
Productive public investment generates welfare gains in the both the short and long run and
welfare losses in the medium run. Note that larger values of η increase not only the positive
short- and long-run welfare effects but also—due to the wealth effect on labor supply—the
medium-run welfare losses. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel (d), the second-best optimal ωIG
rises linearly with the size of the public capital spillover. Note that the slope of the line is
below unity, showing that a given η sustains a smaller second-best optimal GDP share of
public investment, reflecting the deadweight loss of labor tax financing.
5.2 Quantitative Short-Run and Long-Run Effects
Table 2 presents the short-run and long-run effects of the balanced budget public investment
shock. In the benchmark case, the long-run output multiplier amounts to 2.25, which falls
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naturally short of the value of 2.71 obtained by Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010), who
assume a non-distortionary financing scenario. The positive output multiplier reflects the
larger stocks of public and private capital in the long run. In fact, the long-run private
capital multiplier amounts to 4.08, owing to ‘crowding-in’ of public investment by private
investment. In contrast, because the benchmark case sets σC = 1 (so that σ¯L = 0), the
long-run employment multiplier is zero [see (29)]. The long-run output expansion comes at
the cost of a much larger short-run contraction, however. Indeed, the distortionary nature of
labor taxes together with the wealth effect on labor supply generate a short-run employment
multiplier of -1.72 and a short-run output multiplier of -3.68. Moreover, compared with Bom,
Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010), the labor market distortions give rise to stronger short-run
crowding-out of private investment by public investment.
Varying the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply affects only the wage multiplier in the
long run. In fact, because Cobb-Douglas preferences are assumed (i.e., σC = 1), the long-run
employment multiplier is zero irrespective of ωLL. Consequently, the long-run multipliers of
private capital, output, private consumption, private investment, foreign assets, and labor
tax rate are also independent of ωLL. In the short run, however, the employment multiplier
is less negative for lower values of ωLL. As a result, the short-run output contraction is much
less severe for ωLL = 1 than for ωLL = 2 and absent altogether for ωLL = 0. Likewise, in
absolute terms, the short-run negative multiplier of private investment falls substantially for
ωLL = 1, and even turns positive for ωLL = 0.
An elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (σC) slightly larger (smaller)
than one yields a positive (negative) long-run employment multiplier. As a consequence, all
long-run multipliers excepting that of the real wage are (in absolute value) somewhat larger
(smaller) than in the benchmark case. In the short run, the economically meaningful case
of a small positive uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply (i.e., σC = 1.25) yields a
positive effect of public investment on private consumption, although at the cost of further
depressing employment, private investment, and output.
Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, unproductive public spending (i.e., η = 0) does not
affect the steady-state level of output, since neither employment nor capital react to public
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investment in the long run. As the size of the public capital externality increases, the long-
run output multiplier expands, although again at the cost of an even larger short-run output
contraction. As in the case of σC > 1, a sufficiently large value of η generates a positive
short-run response of private consumption, but exacerbates the negative short-run effects on
employment and private investment. The long-run multiplier of the stock of foreign debt is
negative and decreases with η.
The bottom section of Table 2 displays the short-run and long-run effects on instanta-
neous aggregate utility—which are denoted by U˜(0) and U˜(∞), respectively—and follow from
using U˜(t) = X˜(t)− P˜ (t). In addition, the table presents the change in lifetime utility of an
infinitely-lived representative agent, dΛR(0), which is derived from (1) with β = 0 imposed.
To assess the welfare costs of labor taxation, we report the welfare effects of public invest-
ment under lump-sum (or head) tax financing and labor tax financing (labeled ‘H’ and ‘L,’
respectively). The results show that, despite the short-run contraction in output and private
consumption, instantaneous welfare rises both in the short and in the long run in the cases
where public capital is productive. In the short run, instantaneous utility rises by more under
labor tax than lump-sum tax financing, owing to the boost in leisure consumption. In the
long run, however, the labor market distortions cause the instantaneous welfare effect to be
larger in the lump-sum tax financing scenario. Similarly, lifetime utility only rises if public
capital is sufficiently productive. In the benchmark case, the lifetime utility losses from labor
market distortions amount to 58 percent of the lifetime welfare gains.
6 Conclusions
The paper studies the dynamic macroeconomic and welfare effects of public investment in a
micro-founded model of a small open economy in the OECD area. The government keeps the
budget balanced by employing distortionary labor taxes to finance public investment. The
household sector of the model extends a Yaari-Blanchard model of overlapping generations by
introducing an intertemporal labor supply effect, public capital, and distortionary taxation.
One the one hand, public capital generates positive spillovers to private production. On the
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other hand, the labor tax distorts the labor market.
For a plausible calibration of the model, we find dampened cyclical dynamics in key
macroeconomic variables. The cycles are induced by the combination of finite planning hori-
zons of households, the wealth effect on labor supply, and the balanced budget fiscal rule.
A balanced budget permanent impulse to public investment increases long-run output and
private consumption, which is in line with empirical evidence. The benchmark case of Cobb-
Douglas preferences yields a long-run output multiplier of 2.25. In the short run, however,
the strong decrease in employment causes an even larger output contraction, which is ac-
companied by a decrease in private investment and private consumption. An elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure larger than unity or a sufficiently large output
elasticity of public capital or both increase the long-run output multiplier above the bench-
mark value and exacerbate the negative short-run effect on employment, private investment,
and output. Short-run private consumption rises, however.
Finally, our numerical analysis reveals that a balanced budget public investment impulse
improves households’ lifetime welfare in the benchmark analysis. Bom and Ligthart’s (2008)
short-run estimate of the output elasticity of public capital of 0.08 implies an optimal public
investment ratio of about 6 percent of GDP, which is well above the OECD average. Therefore,
our results suggest that, from a welfare point of view, public investment should be encouraged
even in the second-best scenario in which governments have to resort to distortionary labor
tax financing.
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Figure 2: Stability Regions for Various Values of tL and σC
Notes: The dotted line represents the upper bound of the stable, non-cyclical region and the lower solid
line demarcates the lower bound of the unstable region. The light grey area represents an unstable zone
and the dark grey area in between the dashed lines shows combinations of points on the negatively sloped
segment of the Laffer curve [see (30) and (33)]. The upper north-east corner—which is bounded by the solid
and dashed lines—represents a stable, non-cyclical region. Point C denotes the benchmark calibration.
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Figure 3: Long-Run Effects of a Public Investment Impulse:
The Labor Market and Savings System
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Notes: The top panel depicts labor market equilibrium. Aggregating equation (9) yields the labor supply
curve Ls, whereas equation (17) gives the labor demand curve Ld. The bottom panel displays the savings
system. The MKR locus denotes the modified Keynes-Ramsey rule (13) and the household budget identity
(HBI) is given by the aggregate version of (4).
Figure 4: Dynamic Effects of a Permanent Public Investment Impulse:
Various Values of ωLL
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Notes: The vertical axis reports the relative change in the respective macroeconomic variable. The solid line denotes
the benchmark scenario of ωLL = 2, the dashed line represents ωLL = 1, and the dotted line represents ωLL = 0.
The other parameters are set at their benchmark values (Table 1). The size of the public investment impulse
amounts to I˜G = 0.1. 31
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Figure 6: Dynamic Welfare Effects of Public Investment and
Optimal Public Investment-to-GDP Ratio
Panel (a): Welfare Effects: Various ωLL Panel (b): Optimal ω
I
G: Various ωLL
�LL
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Welfare losses
Welfare gains
Panel (c): Welfare Effects: Various η Panel (d): Optimal ωIG: Various η
�I G
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Notes: Panels (a) and (c) depict the dynamic welfare effects for various parameter values. Panels (b) and (d) show the
optimal public investment-to-GDP ratio for various values of ωLL and η, respectively. In Panel (a), the solid line denotes
the scenario of ωLL = 2 (benchmark), the dashed line represents ωLL = 1, and the dotted line represents ωLL = 0. In
Panel (c), the dotted-dashed line shows η = 0.10, the solid line depicts η = 0.08 (benchmark), the dashed line represents
η = 0.05, and the dotted line represents η = 0. The other parameters are set at their benchmark values (Table 1). The
area below the dots in Panels (b) and (d) denotes the parameter combinations for which a lifetime welfare gain is obtained.
Point C denotes the calibration point. The size of the public investment impulse amounts to I˜G = 0.1.
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Table 1: Chosen and Implied Parameter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Parameter/Share Value
Panel (a): Chosen Values
Birth rate β 0.018
Rate of interest r 0.040
Depreciation rate of private capital δ 0.100
Depreciation rate of public capital δG 0.100
Output elasticity of public capital η 0.080
Parameter of the installation function for private capital z¯ 0.532
Parameter of the installation function for public capital z¯G 0.532
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio ωCG 0.200
Public investment-to-GDP ratio ωIG 0.050
Private consumption-to-GDP ratio ωC 0.550
Leisure-labor ratio ωLL 2.000
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure σC 1.000
Panel (b): Selected Implied Values
Private investment-private capital ratio I/K 0.110
Public investment-public capital ratio IG/KG 0.110
Output-private capital ratio Y/K 0.550
Output-public capital ratio Y/KG 2.200
Tobin’s q q 1.210
Balanced budget labor income tax rate tL 0.350
Output elasticity of private capital εY 0.288
Elasticity of the private accumulation function ρA 0.171
Elasticity of the public accumulation function χG 0.091
Preference weight of private consumption in utility function εC 0.370
Leisure-full consumption ratio ωN 0.630
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ω¯LL 2.000
Pure rate of time preference α 0.039
Stable root 1 h∗1 0.158
Stable root 2 h∗2 0.017
Unstable root 1 r∗1 0.198
Unstable root 2 r∗2 0.058
Notes: Panel (a) shows the parameters and shares of the benchmark analysis. Panel (b) presents implied
values of selected economic variables and shares.
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Table 2: Macroeconomic Multipliers and Welfare Effects of a Permanent
Increase in Public Investment
Benchmark ωLL σC η
0 1 0.75 1.25 0 0.05 0.10
Multipliers:
dY (0)
dIG
-3.6756 0.0000 -1.6334 -3.2082 -4.1838 -0.0866 -2.3297 -4.5728
dY (∞)
dIG
2.2464 2.2464 2.2464 2.0265 2.5157 0.0000 1.4040 2.8080
dC(0)
dIG
-0.0473 0.0000 -0.0515 -0.2835 0.2062 -1.1629 -0.4657 0.2316
dC(∞)
dIG
0.7139 0.7139 0.7139 0.5468 0.9185 -1.1898 0.0000 1.1898
dI(0)
dIG
-1.8411 0.2734 -0.4110 -1.3845 -2.6118 -0.1206 -1.1959 -2.2712
dI(∞)
dIG
0.4493 0.4493 0.4493 0.4053 0.5031 0.0000 0.2808 0.5616
dF (0)
dIG
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dF (∞)
dIG
-2.0806 -2.0806 -2.0806 -1.8591 -2.3518 -4.7460 -3.0801 -1.4143
dL(0)
dIG
-1.7202 0.0000 -1.1466 -1.5015 -1.9580 -0.0405 -1.0903 -2.1401
dL(∞)
dIG
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0733 0.0897 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dK(0)
dIG
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dK(∞)
dIG
4.0839 4.0839 4.0839 3.6841 4.5733 0.0000 2.5524 5.1048
dw(0)
dIG
3.1730 0.0000 0.9400 2.7695 3.6117 0.0748 2.0112 3.9475
dw(∞)
dIG
4.8000 1.6000 3.2000 4.8000 4.8000 0.0000 3.0000 6.0000
dtL(0)
dIG
2.6941 1.4040 1.9773 2.5301 2.8725 1.4344 2.2217 3.0091
dtL(∞)
dIG
0.6155 0.6155 0.6155 0.6927 0.5210 1.4040 0.9112 0.4184
Welfare Effects:
U˜L(0) 0.0079 0.0000 0.0050 0.0076 0.0083 -0.0038 0.0035 0.0108
U˜H(0) 0.0035 0.0000 0.0031 0.0034 0.0037 -0.0020 0.0014 0.0049
U˜L(∞) 0.0024 0.0065 0.0035 0.0022 0.0027 -0.0040 0.0000 0.0040
U˜H(∞) 0.0030 0.0065 0.0042 0.0028 0.0033 -0.0027 0.0009 0.0044
dΛLR(0) 0.0177 0.0351 0.0185 0.0143 0.0236 -0.0959 -0.0249 0.0461
dΛHR (0) 0.0280 0.0351 0.0355 0.0232 0.0329 -0.0674 -0.0077 0.0519
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, all parameters are set at their benchmark values (Table 1), where ωLL = 2, σC = 1,
and η = 0.08. U˜ i(t) denotes the relative change in instantaneous utility at time t for i = {H,L}, where H and L
stand for lump-sum tax financing and labor tax financing, respectively. ΛiR(t) represents the present discounted value
of utility of an infinitely-lived representative agent: ΛiR(t) ≡
∫∞
t lnU(τ)e
−α(τ−t)dτ .
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Appendix
This Appendix derives a number of key expressions used in the main text. Bom and Ligthart
(2011) provide further details on the derivations.
A.1 The Reduced-Form Model
The model can be condensed to
˙˜z(t) = ∆z˜(t)− Γ(t), (A.1)
where ∆ is the 4× 4 Jacobian matrix:
∆ ≡

0 rωIρAωA 0 0
rεY
ωA
(1− ξyk) r − rεYωA ξyx 0
0 0 r − α − r−αωA
rωw¯ξw¯k 0 r(ωw¯ξw¯x − ωX) r

,
where ωw¯ ≡ w¯/Y is the output share of after-tax wages and the policy shock terms are
denoted by:
γq (t) ≡ rεY
ωA
[
ξyg(1− e−χGt) + ξyd
]
I˜G,
γA (t) ≡ −r
[
ωw¯ξw¯g(1− e−χGt) + ωw¯ξw¯d
]
I˜G.
The ξyj coefficients are as follows:
ξyk ≡ εY (1 + ω¯LL)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξyx ≡ − (1− εY )ωLL
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
,
ξyg ≡ η(1 + ω¯LL)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξyd ≡ − ω¯LLω
I
G(1 + θ¯L)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
,
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where θ¯L ≡ tL/(1− tL). For employment, the coefficients are given by:
ξlk ≡ εY ω¯LL(1 + θ¯L)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξlx ≡ − ωLL
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
,
ξlg ≡ ω¯LL(1 + θ¯L)η
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξld ≡ − 1
1− εY
ω¯LLω
I
G(1 + θ¯L)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
.
Finally, for the wage rate the coefficients are:
ξwk ≡ εY (1− ω¯LLθ¯L)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξwx ≡ ωLLεY
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
,
ξwg ≡ (1− ω¯LLθ¯L)η
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
, ξwd ≡ 1
1− εY
ω¯LLεY ω
I
G(1 + θ¯L)
1 + ω¯LL[εY (1 + θ¯L)− θ¯L]
.
The coefficients for after-tax wages are given by:
ξw¯k ≡ ξwk + θ¯L(ξlk + ξwk), ξw¯x ≡ ξwx + θ¯L(ξlx + ξwx),
ξw¯g ≡ ξwg + θ¯L(ξlg + ξwg), ξw¯d ≡ ξwd + θ¯L(ξld + ξwd)− ω
I
G(1 + θ¯L)
1− εY .
A.2 Deriving the Long-Run Employment Multiplier
Equation (9) can be fully differentiated with respect to IG to arrive at a general expression
for the labor supply effect:
dL(∞)
dIG
=
1− L
w
dw(∞)
dIG
− 1− L
1− tL
dtL(∞)
dIG
− 1− L
ωN
dωN (∞)
dIG
− 1− L
X
dX(∞)
dIG
. (A.2)
The first three terms capture the intratemporal substitution effect on labor supply and the
last term captures the negative wealth effect or intertemporal substitution effect on labor
supply.
The first two terms are derived in the main text [see (28) and (32)]. To derive dωN (∞)/dIG,
we fully differentiate (10):
dωN (∞)
dIG
= ωN (1− σC)
[
1
w
dw(∞)
dIG
− 1
1− tL
dtL(∞)
dIG
− 1
P
dP (∞)
dIG
]
= ωN (1− σC)(1− ωN )
[
1
w
dw(∞)
dIG
− 1
1− tL
dtL(∞)
dIG
]
, (A.3)
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where we have used the long-run change in the price index (using (11)):
dP (∞)
dIG
= ωNP
[
1
w
dw(∞)
dIG
− 1
1− tL
dtL(∞)
dIG
]
. (A.4)
To obtain an expression for dX(∞)/dIG, we note that the steady-state version of equation
(13) implies a fixed ratio of total assets to full consumption: A/X = (r−α)/β(α+ β), which
can be differentiated to give:
dA(∞)
dIG
=
A
X
dX(∞)
dIG
=
r − α
β(α+ β)
dX(∞)
dIG
. (A.5)
After differentiating the steady-state (aggregate) version of the household budget identity (4),
we obtain:
dX(∞)
dIG
=
X
w
dw(∞)
dIG
− X
1− tL
dtL(∞)
dIG
. (A.6)
Using dtL(∞)/dIG [from (31)], (A.3), and (A.6), we find the labor multiplier (29).
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Table A1: Summary of the Log-Linearized Model
(a) Dynamic Equations:
˙˜K(t) =
rωI
ωA
[
I˜(t)− K˜(t)
]
(TA.1)
˙˜q(t) = rq˜(t)− rεY
ωA
[
Y˜ (t)− K˜(t)
]
(TA.2)
˙˜X(t) = (r − α)
[
X˜(t)− A˜(t)
ωA
]
(TA.3)
˙˜A(t) = r
[
A˜(t) + ωw¯ ˜¯w(t)− ωXX˜(t)
]
(TA.4)
˙˜KG(t) = χG
[
I˜G − K˜G(t)
]
(TA.5)
(b) Static Equations:
q˜(t) = ρA
[
I˜(t)− K˜(t)
]
(TA.6)
w˜(t) = Y˜ (t)− L˜(t) (TA.7)
Y˜ (t) = εY K˜(t) + (1− εY )L˜(t) + ηK˜G(t), (TA.8)
L˜(t) = ωLL
[
˜¯w(t)− ω˜N (t)− X˜(t)
]
(TA.9)
C˜(t) = − ωN
1− ωN ω˜N (t) + X˜(t) (TA.10)
F˜ (t) = A˜(t)− ωA
[
q˜(t) + K˜(t)
]
(TA.11)
t˜L(t) =
1
(1− εY )(1− tL)
[
ωIGI˜G + ω
C
GC˜G
]
− tL
1− tL
[
w˜(t) + L˜(t)
]
(TA.12)
(c) Definitions:
P˜ (t) = ωN ˜¯w(t) (TA.13)
ω˜N (t) = (1− σC)
[
˜¯w(t)− P˜ (t)
]
(TA.14)
˜¯w(t) = w˜(t)− t˜L(t) (TA.15)
Notes: The following definitions are used: ωA ≡ r(qK/Y ), ωI ≡ I/Y , ωCG ≡ C/Y , ωIG ≡ IG/Y , ωw ≡ w¯/Y ,
ωLL ≡ (1− L)/L, ωX ≡ X/Y , ρA ≡ −(I/K)(Φ′′/Φ′) > 0, and χG ≡ IGΦ′G(·)/KG > 0. A tilde (˜) denotes a
relative change, for example, C˜(t) ≡ dC(t)/C. However, for financial assets we scale by steady-state output
and multiply by r (e.g., A˜(t) ≡ rdA(t)/Y ) and for labor taxes we use t˜L(t) ≡ dtL(t)/(1− tL).
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